This paper examines the gap which would exist between short run effects of implementing a value added tax and long run ones. These effects are captured using a CGE model applied to the Cameroon case.
INTRODUCTION
Accordingly to the positive theory of taxation, the economic incidence of an indirect tax can differ whether one considers a short run or a long run time horizon. The level of mobility of all production factors across sectors is one of the main arguments which explain this difference. Indeed, it is assumed that in the short run, for financial and technological constraints, some production factors, e.g. the capital, remain fixed and specific to each economic sector. In the long run, on the contrary, it is admitted that all factors become variable and mobile throughout economic sectors.
Thus, the shifts in relative prices induced in the short run due to a tax reform can differ from those generated in the long run.
The central question addressed in this study is to assess the gap which would exist between short term and long term effects of a VAT (value-added tax) implementation in an economy. In order to bring some answers to this query, we study here the case of the VAT gradually introduced in Cameroon since 1994. We use, in this respect, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and consider successively three VAT scenarios, which nearly reflect some steps of the gradual introduction of a VAT to Cameroon. We simulate moreover a fourth scenario which represents the ultimate stage that portrays a pure VAT. Each VAT scenario is simulated in a dualistic way : on the one hand, we use a short term version of the model and, on the other hand, a long term version of the same model. Incidences of these scenarios are mainly measured on households' welfare, while passing by resources reallocation analysis.
In the literature, CGE models used for VAT incidence analysis are of two kinds, with respect to resource mobility. On the one hand, there are CGE models with capital fixed and specific for each sector, which are better fitted to capture transitional effects of implementing taxes of VAT type (e.g. Clarete (1991) ; Emini (2000) ). On the other hand, there are CGEs which are suitable to explore long run effects, all production factors being variable and inter-sectorally mobile (e.g. Serra-Puche (1984) ; Ballard et. al. (1985) ; Fehr et. al. (1993) and van der Mensbrugghe (1994) ). Although tax incidence analysis is enlightening in each case, it would be worth to pinpoint the direction and to gauge the width taken by the impacts from one time horizon to another ; in particular from the transitional period to the period at which companies can adjust the level of each of their factors. The analytical specificity of this study lays consequently on its comparative approach for the cameroonian VAT case.
The remainder of this paper is split up into five sections. In the first one, we present some heuristic assumptions about the incidence of VAT implementation on the payment and reallocation of production factors. The second section is devoted to a thumbnail sketch of some salient characteristics of the VAT performed in Cameroon, whereas the CGE model applied here is presented in the third section. The fourth focuses on the definition of the VAT scenarios and the analysis of results from aforesaid scenarios' simulations. In the last section, we make some concluding comments.
I. AN HEURISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE VAT INCIDENCE ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION
It is generally argued that, thanks to its economic neutrality, the VAT allows a more efficient resource allocation compared to the other sale taxes. With regard to the production apparatus, this neutrality rests in particular on the deductibility of the VAT paid by companies on the purchases of their intermediate consumption and other inputs. Thus, by adopting the VAT in substitution of a tax which is not deductible on inputs (i.e. taxes with cascade), that induces a resource reallocation more beneficial to sectors whose tax burden on inputs was heavier in the system with cascade, and conversely for sectors for which this burden was relatively light. This presumption is supported here by capturing the direct impact that the VAT neutrality generates on the factor payments. In CGE modelling, the total payment of the whole of primary factors for a branch i is generally stated by the means of the value added price ( PX is the price of the production at factor cost, in the sector i ; i X , the volume of production ;
ht j PQ , the market composite price of goods j, net of all taxes ; j tx , the average rate of all taxes collected on the sales of goods j ; 
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The shift from taxes with cascade to VAT would then lead to a production cost reduction, equal to i ℑ (amount of the input tax burden in the cascade tax system) :
Ceteris paribus, the cancellation of i ℑ (due to VAT refunds) implies an increase of Considering a short run time horizon, the VAT allocative effects transmitted by the way of inequation 4 can be depicted through figure 1, which represents a two sectors economy, each using two primary factors: a variable and mobile factor (the labor), and a fixed and specific one (the capital). To maximize its profit, each sector demands labor until the value of marginal product of that factor is equal to its marginal cost (i.e. wage rate). For the whole of the economy, the labor offer is shared out over sectors so that, at the equilibrium, the value of marginal product of labor is the same in all sectors and equal to the wage rate:
where LBS mpl ,
HBS mpl
and w are respectively the marginal product of labor (MPL) in the ex ante light burden sector, the MPL in the sector with heavier taxation burden, and the wage rate. Given any level of PVA, the marginal product of labor is decreasing when the volume of labor increases, because of the decreasing returns law. Before the implementation of VAT, the equilibrium point for optimal allocation of labor is E 0 , which corresponds to a wage rate equal to w 0 and labor demands equal to 1.2 -The resource reallocation process generated by VAT : two sectors and two mobile factors case Given two sectors (HBS and LBS), and two mobile factors (capital and labour), figure 2 depicts on the one hand, the correlation which exists between the shift on sectors' value added relative prices and the change on factors' relative prices. On the other hand, this figure exhibits the relation binding the shift on relative prices of these factors to shift on factor intensities, for each sector. Thereafter figure 3 depicts the incidence of the change in factor intensities on factors reallocation.
Figure 2 -VAT incidence on factors' relative prices and factors' intensities
Assuming irreversibility of the factor intensities, there is a unique correlation between the relative price (at factor cost) of two goods and the relative price of mobile factors used for their production: a raise in relative price of a good brings at new equilibrium an increase in relative price of the factor used intensely in the production of this good (de Melo and Grether (1995) ). In figures 2 and 3, the production is capital intensive in the sector with heavy ex ante tax burden, whereas it is labor intensive in LBS. From the heuristic analysis presented above, it arises that whatever the temporal horizon considered, the substitution of the VAT to taxes with cascade generates a resource reallocation that is more favorable to the activities which bore heavier tax burden in the system with cascade.
However, this analysis remains very limited in several ways. First of all, it does not make it possible to state whether reallocation gains of the HBS activities and the reallocation losses of the LBS ones are more consistent in the long run or in the short run. Moreover, whatever the time horizon considered, the reallocation scheme which arises from VAT implementation doesn't give the direction nor the width of the welfare change. Several other variables and interrelationships must be taken into account for this issue. Hence the formulation of a CGE model, which could involve several features.
II. SOME KEY FEATURES OF VAT IN CAMEROON
The VAT came into force in Cameroon since 1994. It was applied then in an embryonic way, exclusively to the imports, to some large factories and wholesalers. But since then, several marginal tax reforms has been gradually implemented, most of them aiming to shift this VAT from its seminal embryonic form towards a less and less imperfect alternatives. Among these marginal reforms, one can particularly note the broadening of VAT base to some retail trades, services and relatively small size companies; the essential condition to fulfil by these legal taxpayers being to keep at least a minimal accountancy and to realize a turnover beyond a threshold defined according to various kinds of activity. It is also worth to underline the recent measures taken since January 1999, namely: (1) the abolition of the reduced VAT rate and consequently the application of a uniform VAT rate equal to 17% (plus municipal additional taxes of 1.7%), whatever the debtor or the product subject to VAT; (2) the refund in cash of VAT credits to particular companies which face structural accumulation of their VAT credits.
However, in spite of these improvements, the VAT in Cameroon remains an imperfect one and is characterized accordingly by a partial neutrality with respect to the productive system.
Roughly speaking, this partial neutrality is especially due to (1) the one month latency which companies must observe before finally recovering their refundable VAT; (2) the coexistence of two VAT regimes: a normal regime and a simplified regime. Belonging to the last one, on the contrary of the first, does not give the right to companies to claim any VAT credit; so input costs of these companies are permanently gross of VAT. Moreover, the VAT applied to the products subject to simplified regime is not refundable even for the companies belonging to the normal regime. In addition, several activities are still excluded from the VAT base and thus subject to none of the two modes referred to above; either because their turnovers are below the required threshold, or because they operate in the informal sector.
III. THE MODEL
The model applied in this study is a variant of the CGE model used in Emini (2000) . In this section, we pass over the presentation of more conventional equations and rather focus on those having concern with (1) short run versus long run resource allocation, (2) the VAT modeling, and (3) with the formulation of welfare indicators. 1 The model involves twenty production sectors among which one distinguishes sectors with heavy ex ante tax burden and those with light ex ante tax burden 2 . Sectors are furthermore differentiated according to taxation regimes applicable to their outputs at the early stage of VAT implementation in Cameroon: products subject to the general VAT rate; products liable to the reduced VAT rate; products liable to excise duty; those subject to non refundable VAT; those liable to the special tax on oil products and those exonerated from VAT.
There is an international differentiation of demand and offer, according to the so called Armington (1969) assumption; i.e. there is an imperfect substitution in goods demand, between imports and imports' local substitutes. The corollary on the offer side implies an imperfect transformation between the production for local market and that for export. Four types of economic agents interact in the model: (1) the households (three classes: the rural households, the semi-urban and the urban ones), (2) companies, (3) the State and (4) the rest of the world. The last two agents do not have an explicit objective function, while companies (through sectors) have a profit maximization behavior and the households an utility maximization one. Models data were processed from Njinkeu et. al. (1993) , Cogneau and Roubaud (1992) , and DSCN (1990) . Substitution and transformation elasticities for international differentiation of demand and offer are closed to those in Condon, Dahl and Devarajan ( 1987) . Likewise, the level and the structure of households' income elasticities are based on estimates from Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982) .
-Equilibrium demand for production factors : Short run vs. long run equations
For any sector i, production i X at factor cost is generated by combining through a Leontief function, primary factors (Labor and capital) on the one hand and intermediate consumptions 
In the short term version of the model, as stated above, the capital is fixed and specific to each branch; so that labor is the only variable and mobile factor. For each sector, the profit maximizing demand for labor is given at the equilibrium point where the marginal productivities of
for all sectors are equal to the marginal cost of labor w; hence:
Given the constant returns of scale and the zero profit assumptions, the payment of the fixed factor, i RK , is computed as a residue after the provision of labor payment.
However in the long term version of the model, demand for capital becomes also endogenous and determined, as for labor, on an extent such that the marginal productivities of capital
). 1 ( α − for all sectors are equal to the marginal cost (the payment rate) r of capital; then:
The value added price is the channel through which VAT implementation directly affects the demand and reallocation of the production factors. Whatever the time horizon, this price is stated such as in equations 13 and 14, respectively for non-VAT sectors (ntv) and VAT ones (ptv). 
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• The VAT effective rates equations
The effective rates tvc entered in equations above are weighted average rates of VAT levied on imports imp M on the one hand, and on domestic substitutes imp D on the other hand. These VAT rates are gross of municipal additional taxes (cac for local products and cac2 for imports). They are determined through equations 17 and 18, respectively for tradable goods (imp) and non tradable ones (nimp). In these equations, tv are VAT effective rates net of municipal additional taxes; Equation 23 implies that: (1) only a Fp i portion of the production from a VATable sector is really subject to VAT; (2) the VAT base involves also all taxes levied on domestic part of the composite product, apart from VAT itself and municipal additional taxes. 4 In the same way, equation 24 computes Tpm by excluding imports exemptions (Exon) and smuggling products (Tcb) from the VAT base, while involving all other customs duties and taxes (in market price of imports PM), except the VAT and the corresponding municipal additional taxes.
The VAT modeling presented above is such that the entire model remains free from any VAT influence as soon as the VAT general rate TVG takes the zero value, as it's the case at the benchmark performance.
-Welfare indicators
The model involve three sets of indicators for welfare analysis: (1) the hicksian equivalent variation and compensating variation (Hicks (1939) ; Shoven and Whalley (1992) ); (2) the HicksBoiteux welfare loss (see Diewert (1985) ; Fortin and Rousseau (1986) ); and (3) the Gini index computed according to the "method of triangles" (see Chauvat and Réau (1996) ).
Set two equilibrium states for a given consumer: a benchmark state (ex ante) and a counterfactual state (ex post). The hicksian equivalent variation (EV) denotes the amount which is necessary to add to (or to deduct from) the benchmark income of the consumer so that he enjoys an utility level equal to the counterfactual one, on the basis of ex ante relative prices. With regard to the compensating variation (CV), it indicates the amount which is necessary to add to (or to cut off from) the consumer's counterfactual income, so that he recovers his benchmark utility level, on the basis of ex post relative prices. According to the calculus rationale adopted in this study, an improvement of utility or welfare results in a positive EV and a negative CV. The reverse is proved accurate for both indicators in the case of a welfare worsening.
In the model applied in this study, the EV and CV are stated from expenditure equations allows to avoid the case in which the welfare improvement would be due to the widening of foreign debt. Whereas the imports and exports can vary differently in quantity terms, the fixed Current Balance constraint is fulfilled via the adjustment of the real exchange rate, i.e. the world price level divided by the domestic price level, and multiplied by the nominal exchange rate. The world prices are exogenous, due to the small country assumption. Likewise, the nominal exchange rate is also exogenous and stated as the model numeraire. The real exchange adjustments are consequently performed through changes in the consumer price index, which is endogenous.
IV. SIMULATIONS
Four pairs of simulations are performed, each pair including the simulation of the same scenario in short run on the one hand, and in long run case on the other hand. The first three scenarios rank amongst various imperfect forms that the VAT have more or less embodied in Cameroon since its adoption in 1994. The last scenario portrays a pure VAT which would be the ultimate stage of a VAT implementation. All these four scenarios imply the cancellation of the former indirect taxes applied to products henceforth subject to VAT, except customs duties and miscellaneous special taxes. Selected results from simulations are reported in annex.
-Scenario 1: standard scenario of the imperfect VAT applied in 1994
The first scenario involves some key features of VAT as implemented at July 1, 1994:
• two VAT rates: a normal rate of 15% and one reduced rate of 5%;
• the same VAT nominal rate is applied as well to the imports as to the domestic substitutes; • exemption of exports and the inputs, as a general rule;
• a 40% reduction of imports exemptions;
• an imperfect deduction of refundable VAT on VATable companies' intermediate consumption: as an experimental proxy, 10% of VAT credits is not refundable;
• a narrow base of VAT.
The results from simulations indicate that in the short run, this scenario is welfare improving at least for the global welfare of households, compared to the benchmark situation: the HicksBoiteux welfare loss is -10.497 billion CFA francs 9 ). However this improvement returns exclusively to the urban households and semi-urban ones. The rural households rather face a welfare worsening which is equivalent to 1,088 billion CFA francs in terms of compensatory variation. In the long run, on the contrary of short run effects, the total welfare worsens, with a social cost equal to 87,780 billion CFA francs. The implementation of the VAT results in a relatively more regressive tax system, since the change in the Gini index is positive, whatever the time horizon of the analysis. In the short run as in the long run, activities with light ex ante tax burden (LBS) are, on the whole, gainers from the resource reallocation; whereas activities with heavy ex ante tax burden (HBS) record reallocation losses and consequently face a fall of their value added. Value added price belonging to HBS increases less than that of LBS. Moreover, the market relative price of HBS's output increases and, hence, the demand for this output decreases. The reallocation scheme which arises from this imperfect VAT scenario is rather opposite to the generally hoped effects from the introduction of VAT into an economy, according to which the HBS would have gained from the resource reallocation. In addition, it is noticeable that the shift from short run to the long run is characterized by a reinforcement of this counter intuitive reallocation pattern, so that capital demand adjustments in the long run result in the migration of a portion of this factor from HBS to the LBS.
-Scenario 2: scenario 1 + abolition of the VAT reduced rate (adoption of a uniform VAT rate)
This scenario is the same one as the first, but removes the VAT reduced to the favor of a uniform application of the VAT normal rate. This measure was taken in Cameroon on January 1, 1999, as a device to render the VAT more neutral, since the application of a uniform VAT rate is one of the key features of a pure VAT.
The incidence of this scenario stands out from that of the first, when considering the width of performance indicators' changes. But signs of these changes remain roughly the same ones. Thus in the short run, the welfare increases with a social cost equal to -70,314 billion CFA francs. This increase is more significant than that recorded in the short run in scenario 1 (social cost of -10,497
billion CFA francs), and this improvement is beneficial to all household classes, while starting with the urban ones, the semi-urban then and for the least, to the rural ones. However, in the long run, this welfare gains disappear and become rather losses. The rural households bear the most significant loss, whereas the urban ones support the least. Notwithstanding, these long run losses However, like above-mentioned, the deduction remains incomplete because of the still ongoing "lag rule" which states a one month lag before deducting VAT bore on inputs. As a consequence, this scenario remains exploratory to some extent.
In the short run, the welfare gains are more significant than those of the previous scenarios.
Urban households still have the most welfare improvement, followed by the semi-urban ones, and finally by the rural ones. In the long run, contrarily to what happens in the first two scenarios, the welfare changes remain positive for urban and semi-urban households, so that rural households are the only ones who face a welfare worsening in this time horizon. The income distribution is more unequal in this scenario than in the precedents. This regressivity strengthens in the long run. The resource reallocation scheme, whether in the short run or in the long run, is similar to that in the first two scenarios. However the gains recorded by the LBS and, in parallel, the resource reallocation losses of the HBS, become more and more negligible. We compare here the effects of short term with those of long term arising from implementation of a pure VAT. All the economic activities (and in particular their outputs) are completely subject to VAT. The simulations results indicate that in the short run, this scenario induces an improvement of the whole welfare compared to the basic situation. However, whereas this improvement is an unprecedented one for the urban households, then for the semi-urban ones, the rural households rather record a welfare worsening. What results in a strong regressivity of pure VAT system: the increase in the Gini coefficient being here the highest compared to that of all other simulations. Nevertheless, it would be worth to notice that, contrarily to the preceding imperfect VAT scenarios, which are welfare worsening when one shifts from the short run to the long run time horizon, the welfare generated by the pure VAT increases in an incredible way when the economy shifts from the short to the long run. The social gain ranges then from 62,451 to 230,266 billion CFA francs. In addition, in the long run, all household classes gain from this significant improvement. The pure VAT prove to be, by far, the most regressive of the four scenarios performed in this study, as well in the short run as in the long run. Even though, its long inequality in income distribution is lesser than the short run one. Contrary to the preceding scenarios which generate a counterintuitive production factors allocation, the reallocation induced by the pure VAT scenario is in accordance with generally expected effects a VAT implementation in an economy.
Thus activities which bore heavier tax burden before VAT implementation henceforth attract more productive factors than activities belonging to LBS. Furthermore, the value added of the HBS activities increases more when shifting from short run to long run time horizon.
V. CONCLUSION
The economic policies taken or to consider can be analyzed from several points of view, in order to have a broader spectrum of their alternative effects. Amongst various optics of analysis in this concern, the comparison of the short run or transitional effects of a policy to its long run effects could be of an unquestionable interest in the decision-making or economic policy orientation. By assimilating the short run to a period when only labor is mobile between production sectors and the long run to a time horizon at which the capital becomes also mobile, the present study focussed on the difference which would arise between short run and long run effects of a VAT implementation.
The results from simulations performed here by using a CGE model applied to the Cameroon case, allow us to underline some salient facts which come from this comparative approach. It thus appears that even if an imperfect VAT could be welfare improving in the short run, this improvement would tend to turn into a welfare deterioration in the long run. On the contrary, if the VAT implemented is a pure one, the transitional welfare improvement of the short run widen in the long run; in the same line, the short time welfare worsening, if any, tends to disappear or to turn into gains in the long run.
Beyond the identification of this differential effects, the study emphasizes in a crucial way the regressive character of VAT as a taxation mode. This regressivity strengthens as one tends from embryonic VAT towards a pure VAT. Ultimately, it arises from our study, at least for the Cameroon case, that to promote a sustainable welfare improvement from VAT implementation, this VAT must be gradually likened to a pure VAT; but some pro-socioeconomic policies must be planned in order to preclude undesirable effects inherent in the greatest tax regressivity. 
Annex: Selected results from simulations outputs

